University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications from the Harold W. Manter
Laboratory of Parasitology

Parasitology, Harold W. Manter Laboratory of

6-1999

Species: Turning a Conundrum Into a Research Program
Daniel R. Brooks
University of Toronto, dnlbrooks@gmail.com

Deborah A. McLennan
University of Toronto

E. C. Bernard
University of Tennessee

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/parasitologyfacpubs
Part of the Parasitology Commons

Brooks, Daniel R.; McLennan, Deborah A.; and Bernard, E. C., "Species: Turning a Conundrum Into a
Research Program" (1999). Faculty Publications from the Harold W. Manter Laboratory of Parasitology.
309.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/parasitologyfacpubs/309

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Parasitology, Harold W. Manter Laboratory of at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications from
the Harold W. Manter Laboratory of Parasitology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.

Journal of Nematology 31(2):117–133. 1999.
© The Society of Nematologists 1999.

Species: Turning a Conundrum into a Research Program1
Daniel R. Brooks and Deborah A. McLennan2
Abstract: The most appropriate ontological basis for understanding the role of species in evolutionary
biology is the Evolutionary Species Concept. The ESC is not an operational concept, but one version of
the Phylogenetic Species Concept is. Linking the ontology of species with the epistemological basis of
actual biological studies requires that we specify both a discovery mode for identifying collections of
organisms that we believe are evolutionary species, and a series of evaluation criteria for assessing those
entities we have discovered. Simply naming a collection of specimens, no matter how strong one’s
evolutionary beliefs, is not sufficient for declaring that evolutionary species have been discovered. All
operational historical species concepts represent discovery modes with minimal evaluation criteria; all
operational non-dimensional species concepts represent evaluation criteria that do not specify discovery
modes. Thus, both categories of knowledge are necessary and neither is sufficient for assigning species
status. This leads naturally to a hierarchical research program in historical ecology, beginning with
phylogenetic analysis of a group of entities postulated to be evolutionary species, which provides a
productive arena for our arguments about species concepts.
Key words: Evolutionary Species Concept, historical ecology, Phylogenetic Species Concept, phylogeny, speciation.

“Why is not all nature in confusion, instead of the species being, as we see them,
well defined?” (Darwin, 1872:161).
A Short History of the
“Species Problem”
It is not uncommon for major scientific
concepts to have ambiguous definitions. In
Biology, one such term is “species.” This
dilemma pre-dates Darwin (Stevens, 1992).
Initially, the “species” was simply a category
in classifications, the least inclusive group of
organisms to be recognized formally. That
the biosphere was organized into an internested hierarchy of species and groups of
species was thought to be self-evident. It was
simply the nature of the world that organReceived for publication 20 November 1998.
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isms grouped naturally into discrete species,
species into genera, genera into families,
and so on until all living things were included in a single classification of life. PreDarwinian taxonomists, like all natural philosophers of the day, argued that the only
“real” entities were those that had immutable spatio-temporal existence. Because of
their unchangeable nature, such bits of reality could be grouped into “classes” defined by the fixed properties of their components. Classic examples of such “real”
entities, which at the time were called “species,” are “hydrogen” and “gold.” Like
these other natural kinds, biological species
existed and conformed to a single hierarchical classification simply because it pleased
the Creator for it to be so. In the absence of
any causal principles explaining the taxonomic hierarchy linking species together,
pre-Darwinian taxonomists relied on aesthetics, intuition, and personal judgement
to make decisions.
Darwin (1859) complicated things by suggesting that while organisms could indeed
be grouped naturally into species, these biological “species” were not immutable. Darwin’s belief in both the reality and the evolutionary nature of biological species was
based on several empirical observations.
First, comparing fossil and living species suggested that the species populating the
planet today are not the same as those populating the planet in the past. Second, the
117
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world today is not populated by a small number of species widely distributed in many different habitats in many different parts of the
world; different species live in different parts
of the world. And third, all living and extinct
species fit into a single hierarchical classification that looks like a genealogy. Using
perhaps the original form of the “Wiley Criterion” (Brooks and McLennan, 1991), Darwin suggested that if it looked like a genealogy, it was one.
This conclusion led Darwin to his first
theory—that all species on this planet were
related to each other through a single common history of descent with modification:
phylogeny. It is not mere happenstance that
the only illustration Darwin ever placed in
any edition of Origin of Species was a phylogenetic tree (Bowler, 1996). Darwin had created a dual role for species in biology. In
addition to being units of classification, species were now also units of evolutionary process; identifying and classifying species was
not simply a matter of convenience, it was
explanatory. From the statements about species in Origin of Species, it is clear that Darwin
recognized this duality. Biologists have attempted to resolve this dualism in a variety
of ways during the past 140 years, but it still
exists. For example, Ereshevsky (1992)
stated “Biological systematists attempt to
provide a taxonomy of the world’s organic
diversity. Evolutionary biologists attempt to
explain why that diversity exists.”
Following the publication of Origin of Species, taxonomists, by and large, continued to
concentrate on species as units of classification and tended to ignore evolutionary
principles, invoking these principles only to
justify taxonomic decisions made following traditional (pre-evolutionary) practices.
Stevens (1992) noted that, at the end of the
19th century, the primary taxonomic guidelines for dealing with species were (i) they
should be easily recognizable to laymen, (ii)
taxonomic nomenclature should be stable,
and (iii) there should not be too many
names. This led some to assert that species
were whatever good taxonomists said they
were (Regan, 1926; Dobzhansky, 1937; Gilmour, 1940; Camp, 1951), echoing one of

Darwin’s comments: “Hence, in determining whether a form should be ranked as a
species or a variety, the opinion of naturalists having sound judgement and wide experience seems the only guide to follow. We
must, however, in many cases, decide by a
majority of naturalists, for well-marked and
well-known varieties can be named which
have not been ranked as species by at least
some competent judges” (Darwin, 1872).
Such concerns still preoccupy the minds
of some taxonomists (Grant, 1985). In the
second half of the 20th century, evolutionary
taxonomy (Mayr, 1969) epitomized the preDarwinian view that taxonomy was partly science and partly art form, with a sizeable
component of personal judgement and intuition involved in trying to justify taxonomic decisions in terms of evolutionary
principles. Phenetics, or numerical taxonomy (Sneath and Sokal, 1973; Levins,
1979), by contrast, abandoned all efforts to
provide a link between taxonomy and evolution by advocating purely empirical classification procedures having no particular
connection with evolutionary principles.
Hull (1965) presciently described taxonomy
at this time as the inheritor of 2,000 years of
stasis resulting from the notion that all units
of classification had to have uniquely defining (and hence unchanging) characters, an
indication that the Darwinian revolution still
had not penetrated deeply into taxonomic
practice.
Other biologists have dealt with Darwin’s
dualism by attempting to replace the preDarwinian taxonomic concept of species
with one based strictly in evolutionary
mechanisms or by trying to eliminate the
species concept altogether. Darwin wrote
musingly about the possibility that the species recognized by taxonomists were not evolutionary units, but by the late 1930s this
viewpoint began to gain momentum and focus. The Synthetic Theory of Evolution
(e.g., Dobzhansky, 1937; Mayr, 1942; Simpson, 1944) sought to synthesize Genetics,
emphasizing the ways in which species interacted with their abiotic and biotic surroundings, with Paleontology, emphasizing the
historical pattern of the origin, diversifica-
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tion, and extinction of species. The introduced a new dualism into the question of
species in evolutionary biology. The genetical perspective viewed species as reproductive units, whereas the paleontological perspective viewed species as historical units.
Biologists interested in seeing “evolution
in action” concentrated more and more on
local inbreeding populations (or demes),
claiming that these groups of “replicators”
were the most inclusive level of evolutionary
processes (e.g., Ehrlich and Raven, 1969).
After all, Dobzhansky (1937) had asserted
that species were “stages” in evolution,
which only appeared well delimited to us
because we were unable to see them
through significant periods of time, while
Mayr (1942) suggested that they were “products” of evolution. A critical step in developing this view was the emergence of what
Mayr (1942, 1963, 1988) called populational
thinking. Advocates of populational thinking
treat species as assemblages of organisms
held together by reproductive bonds that
are exclusive to them, which can develop
like an individual organism (but do not have
to die of old age), and “reproduce” by something analogous to binary fission. This approach allowed biologists to move away from
a static or typological view because it treated
species as collections of organisms characterized by both common and variable traits.
Emphasis on populational thinking, however, undermined the belief that species
were central to evolutionary theory. Population geneticists soon learned that the actual
reproductive structure in many species lies
at the level of local breeding units (demes),
not at the level of the entire species. This led
many to conclude that only demes and
populations were real, with species being
taxonomic artifacts. One of the earliest and
most influential advocates of this perspective was Julian Huxley, editor of The New Systematics (Huxley, 1940), and ironically, a descendant of Darwin’s most influential and
vocal advocate, Thomas Huxley.
Simpson (1944, 1953, 1961) was among
the few founders of the New Synthesis who
actually advocated a synthesis by integrating
the taxonomic and evolutionary concepts of

species. Without such integration, taxonomy
has no scientific basis and evolutionary biology has no way to determine its units of
study. As a paleontologist, Simpson was particularly interested in making certain that
the development of evolutionary biology included the “deep history” evidence provided by fossils. He did not view species as
either “stages” or “products” of evolution
but rather as “active participants” in evolution, identifying them as historical lineages
that carried part of the past with them and
also responded to long-term selection pressures.
For founding neo-Darwinians like Simpson, two problems arose from viewing species solely as reproductive units. First, the
collection of demes construed as representing a species often exhibits more geographical and ecological cohesion and temporal persistence than the demes themselves
(demes can disappear and re-form without
destroying the species), suggesting that
there is reality to collections of demes. Second, if species are not real, then neither is
speciation, and evolution is reduced solely
to processes involved in reproductive exchange within individual demes—that is,
changes in gene frequencies in populations.
This view gives no explanation for the origins of the diversity of demes and collections
of demes that the population geneticists
were studying. Speciation, then, is a real evolutionary process involving collections of
demes but manifested at the level groups of
demes irreversibly split from each other into
two or more sets of descendant demes.
The Eclipse of History in
Species Concepts
From 1955 to 1975 a major modification
of neo-Darwinism occurred. Spearheaded by
luminaries such as Robert MacArthur and
E. O. Wilson, the ‘Evolutionary Ecology’
movement changed neo-Darwinism from a
synthesis of Genetics and Paleontology to a
synthesis of Genetics and Ecology. Advocates of this new view claimed that the focus
of evolutionary processes was interacting
phenotypes (“interactors”) making up eco-
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logical communities rather than gene flow
among “replicators” within populations. Van
Valen (1976) codified this perspective for
species concepts by rejecting “reproductive
concepts” of species in favor of an “ecological species concept.” He asserted that each
species had its own unique niche and it was
the niche, an ecological concept, that defined the species. He also stated that evolution was ecologically controlled, since selection acts on phenotypes, that phenotypes
are produced by individual ontogenies resulting from reproduction, and that reproduction is under ecological control. Finally,
phenotypes are the building blocks of communities—another ecological concept. Thus,
phylogeny was simply a by-product of ecology.
The Evolutionary Ecology revolution
eliminated history from the evolutionary
arena, forcing biologists to define species using “non-dimensional” or “relational” species concepts. Such concepts take the form
of “A is a species relative to B and C if it
maintains its identity as a distinct entity relative to B and C” (Mayr, 1988; Löther, 1990).
These concepts embody no sense of the origin of the species, or of their history. The
prevailing non-dimensional species concept
for more than a quarter century has been
the Biological Species Concept (BSC), proposed
by Dobzhansky (1937, 1940, 1970, 1976) and
championed most strongly by Mayr (1963,
1976, 1982, 1988). This concept centered on
the ways in which species maintained a reproductive identity distinct from other species, with a species being a group of interbreeding or potentially interbreeding organisms reproductively isolated from all
other such groups. Van Valen’s Ecological
Species Concept is also non-dimensional,
centering on the ways in which species maintain an ecological, rather than reproductive,
identity distinct from other species. We refer
to these and related species concepts as isolation concepts of species (Paterson, 1978, 1982,
1985, 1987). Isolation concepts are based on
the assumption that there is a biological
penalty to be paid by making a mistake in
mating. This will tend to lead to the evolution of traits, called isolating mechanisms,

that reduce the probability of making a mating mistake.
Complements to isolation concepts are
those that concentrate on what it is that
makes each species a coherent system. An
original proponent of such views has been
Paterson (1978, 1982, 1985, 1987), whose
Recognition Concept defines species as groups
of individuals held together by a common
and unique Specific Mate Recognition System (SMRS). This and related ideas (e.g.,
Templeton, 1989) are cohesion concepts of
species, following the use of “cohesion” by
Wiley (1978, 1981) (Brooks and Wiley, 1988;
Wiley and Brooks, 1982). Cohesion concepts
are based on the notion that while there is
an evolutionary penalty or cost to be paid
for not reproducing, evolutionary benefits
arise from the evolution of cohesion-enhancing traits.
All non-dimensional species concepts
strive for a universally applicable definition
of what species are. Isolation concepts, however, can be judged only when we know what
constitutes a mistake in breeding, and cohesion concepts can be applied only when we
know what constitutes a penalty for not reproducing. Löther (1990) noted that nondimensional species concepts become progressively more ambiguous as the species being compared become more distant in space
and time.
Debate about whether replicators (reproductive views) or interactors (ecological
views) were the primary focus of evolution
continues without producing a clear consensus of opinion (e.g., Futuyma, 1989; Grant,
1989). The evolutionary ecology revolution,
however, seemed to signal the end of the
concept of species as historical units and,
with it, Simpson’s (1944) hopes for an integration of taxonomic and evolutionary species concepts.
Ending the Eclipse
For those who, despite the Evolutionary
Ecology revolution, continued to believe
that species and speciation were important
aspects of evolution, a major philosophical
problem was determining how species could
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be real without being typological or essentialistic (Hull, 1965). Only then could one
make a case for species as participants in
evolutionary processes and, hence, as real
entities. Ghiselin (1974) provided the solution to the problem by considering species
as if they were individual, rather than collective, entities (Cracraft, 1983; Donoghue,
1985; Frost and Kluge, 1994; Hull, 1976,
1978, 1980; Löther, 1990; Mayden, 1997;
Mayden and Wood, 1995; McKitrick and
Zink, 1988; Mishler and Donoghue, 1982;
Wiley, 1978, 1980a, 1980b, 1989; Wiley and
Mayden, 1999). Biological species are real,
but not in the same sense that “hydrogen” is
real. A molecule of hydrogen found anywhere, and formed at any time, in the universe would be a member of the class hydrogen. By contrast, an organism that looks like
a tiger on this planet would not be part of
the same species as an organism that looks
like a tiger on another planet unless the two
organisms shared a common ancestor.
Simpson (1944) anticipated at least some
sense of Ghiselin’s view of species by emphasizing that species are historically unique lineages extending through time. The most
fundamental characteristic of a species is
that its members form cohesive wholes,
bound together primarily by unique common ancestry as well as by unique sets of
reproductive bonds or common ecology. To
Simpson, the evolution of a single species
was analogous to the development of a
single organism; just as an organism changes
its appearance without losing its identity
during development, so a species can
change its appearance without losing its
identity during evolution. The formation of
new species is analogous to asexual reproduction, in which new individuals are distinct from old individuals because the new
individuals form independent evolutionary
lineages. Over time, distinct historical trajectories emerge from the speciation process,
each differing to some degree from its ancestor and closest relatives, but retaining
some of its ancestry in the form of synapomorphies. We take advantage of this historical mosaic nature of the attributes of organisms that comprise species to reconstruct

phylogenetic trees. Thus, among the founders of the New Synthesis, only Simpson
(1944, 1953, 1961) included a sense of evolutionary history in his conception of what
species were. His suggestion became operational when E. O. Wiley (1978) linked Simpson’s views on species to the empirical
rigor of phylogenetic systematics (Hennig,
1950, 1966).
Frost and Kluge (1994) contrasted what
they termed regular science with historical science. In regular science, like Chemistry, Physics, and Ecology, the basic units of mechanisms, the entities of the science that participate in the processes explained by that
science behave in such a way that each one
can be defined and classified within the conceptual framework of the discipline. Each
entity has a set of defining properties that
exist and are manifested universally. Hydrogen is hydrogen anywhere in the universe;
an herbivore is an herbivore as far as ecological theory is concerned. Scientific endeavors that cannot be studied using the
methods of regular science invariably deal
with historical phenomena, such as cosmology or biological evolution. In historical science, Frost and Kluge (1994) argued, the
entities are not natural kinds but historical
individuals. Theories in historical sciences
cannot define their entities precisely. They
must therefore discover them and can do
that only by approximation. A theory of the
Big Bang might postulate that the universe
ought to be expanding and would stipulate a
discovery method, the Doppler Shift, by
which that expansion might be gauged. But
only after a series of such discoveries would
it be possible to establish whether or not
there was any regularity to the expansion of
the universe. For example, are all the entities involved moving at the same speed in
the same direction? As we know, there is
much agreement among cosmologists that a
Big Bang occurred, and much contention
about just how that Big Bang is unfolding
and will unfold over time. Historical sciences thus rely on a two-stage process involving discovery methods and evaluation criteria, both of which are necessary and neither
of which is sufficient for robust explanation.
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The theory of evolution is a historical
theory, which stipulates that there should be
entities that share a unique phylogenetic
history. We have decided to call those entities species. Species function in evolutionary
theory as the basic units of the origin, diversification, and extinction of biodiversity and
as the largest inclusive grouping of organisms that participates in any evolutionary
process. Species are the unique historical
lineages that make up the hierarchy of phylogenetic diversification. Species are derived
from ancestral species via a number of different possible mechanisms of speciation, the
irreversible splitting of ancestral lineages
into descendant ones. With the advent of
phylogenetic systematic methods, which
provided a strong empirical method for recovering the phylogenetic hierarchy, came
the possibility of discovering the basic units
of that hierarchy and asking empirical questions about their origins.
We will refer to the Evolutionary Species
Concept (Simpson, 1944; Mayden and Wood,
1995; Wiley, 1978, 1980a, 1981; Wiley and
Mayden, 1999) and related concepts (the
Phylogenetic Species Concept, the Cladistic Species Concept, and the Composite Species Concept) (Cracraft, 1983, 1992; de Queiroz and
Donoghue, 1988, 1990; Donoghue, 1985; Eldredge, 1985; Eldredge and Cracraft, 1980;
Endler, 1989; Kornet, 1993; McKitrick and
Zink, 1988; Mishler and Donoghue, 1982;
Ridley, 1989) as historical concepts of species.
Historical concepts integrate well with concepts of species as ontological individuals.
Eldredge and Gould (1972) and others
(Brooks and Wiley, 1988; Wiley and Brooks,
1982), for example, have referred to species
as homeostatic systems held together by cohesion provided by common evolutionary
history. Löther (1990) asserted that species
should be considered ontological individuals because they are material supraorganismal systems, spatiotemporally organized and forming an integrated whole.
Prominent evolutionary biologists who have
recently acknowledged the historical nature
of species, though not explicitly advocating
an historical concept of species, include

Williams (1991) and Maynard Smith and
Szathmary (1995).
Wiley (1978, 1981) stated that any general
species concept must (i) encompass species
persistence through time (which makes
them diagnosable taxonomic units) as well
as their divergence (their evolutionary role),
(ii) recognize that species are cohesive
wholes, and (iii) recognize the inherent historicity of species. Kornet’s (1993) rigorous
logical analysis concluded that species function in evolutionary theory as mutually exclusive, non-arbitrary (discovered, not imposed sensu Frost and Kluge, 1994) historical entities. In a similar vein, Frost and
Kluge (1994; Kluge, 1990) consider species
to be genealogical systems (implying cohesion) existing as lineages of reproductive
connection extended through time, preserving a unique mixture of genetic information. Following these authors, therefore, we
consider the Evolutionary Species Concept
to be the fundamental ontological species
concept for evolutionary biology. As an ontological concept, however, the ESC is not
operational; it does not specify either discovery modes or evaluation criteria. What is
needed is an operational surrogate for the
ESC.
In practice, most taxonomists propose
species names in ways that do not require a
particular species concept. We can accept
such typologically based names as scientific
hypotheses, but we cannot say that they represent explicit hypotheses of evolutionary
species because, for the most part, the naming of species by taxonomists follows preevolutionary practices (traditions, or historical constraints on the discipline) (Stevens,
1992).
“There can be no doubt that we learn the
use of universal words, that is their application to individuals, by ostensive gestures and
by similar means.” (Popper, 1968:65).
Nor is it sufficient for us to say that because we wish to be discovering evolutionary
species, our descriptions become hypotheses of evolutionary species.
“Nobody would dream of justifying the validity of a logical inference, or of defending
it against doubts, by writing beside it in
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the margin the following protocol statement. ‘Protocol: In checking this chain of
inferences today, I experienced an acute
feeling of conviction.’ ” (Popper, 1968:98).
Thus, until Latin binomina are subjected
to a discovery mode appropriate for discerning evolutionary species, we do not know
whether or not a taxonomist has discovered
something that might be an evolutionary
species. The operational surrogate for the
Evolutionary Species concept, therefore, begins with phylogenetic analysis of the collections of organisms given names by taxonomists.
The Species Problem as a
Research Program
Discovering species
Phylogeneticists use characters as approximations or as extensions (perhaps even
metaphors) (E. O. Wiley, pers. comm.) of
the entities themselves, the species. Thus, it
should not be a surprise that there are
several different views on the number
of species discovered by any given phylogenetic tree. Phylogenetic trees comprise two
components—apomorphic characters and
branches. Any intellectual arena that includes 2 variables (A and B) can give rise to
as many as three different viewpoints (only
A, only B, both A and B). Not surprisingly,
biologists have proposed three distinct categories of historical species concepts (Baum
and Donoghue, 1995). These are embodied
in two forms of the Phylogenetic Species Concept
(which we will call the PSC-1 and the PSC-2)
and the Composite Species Concept (CSC) (this
view differs slightly from the taxonomy of
species concepts in Mayden, 1997). These
views differ primarily with respect to how
they subdivide a phylogenetic tree and how
they deal with the issue of ancestral species.
Figure 1 illustrates the similarities and differences among these species concepts. In
Figure 1A, the phylogenetic tree for species
A–G is supported by a single apomorphic
trait for each non-terminal and terminal
branch. All three species concepts recognize
A–G as seven species; in addition, all three
recognize six ancestral species—the six non-

FIG. 1. Differences among the three major historical
species concepts with respect to the number of species
recognized on a phylogenetic tree. A) Each terminal
and non-terminal branch has a single apomorphic
character change; the PSC-1, PSC-2, and CSC all recognize seven terminal and six non-terminal species. B)
Three terminal branches lack autapomorphies; the
PSC-1 and CSC consider those indistinguishable from
their common ancestor. C) Four non-terminal
branches have more than one synapomorphy; the CSC
recognizes a distinct species for each.

terminal branches, for a total of 13 species.
In Figure 1B, species B, C, and G lack apomorphies. Once again, all three species concepts recognize A–G as separate species. The
PSC-2 would again recognize the six nonterminal branches as separate species, for a
total of 13 species. The PSC-1 and CSC, however, would recognize only 10 species, since
B, C, and G are not distinguishable from
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their common ancestors. Finally, in Figure
1C, four of the non-terminal branches of the
phylogenetic tree have more than one apomorphic trait. Once again, all three concepts recognize A–G as separate species.
Also once again, the PSC-2 recognizes six
ancestral species, for a total of 13. The PSC-1
recognizes only 10 species, since B, C, and G
are not distinguishable from their common
ancestors. Finally, the CSC recognizes 15 total species, one for each apomorphic trait
on the phylogenetic tree. These three examples demonstrate that the fundamental
differences between the approaches have to
do with how many ancestral species will be
recognized. We will see later in this contribution that these distinctions sometimes,
but not always, are important to research on
species and speciation.
The PSC-2 is the most consistent of the
historical species concepts since it takes into
account only the branching structure of the
tree; it will differ from the PSC-1 only in not
permitting the existence of persistent ancestors. The PSC-2 recognizes B, C, and G as
different species from their ancestors on the
basis of evidence of lineage splitting but in
the absence of evidence of character evolution (Fig. 1B,C). In terms of evolutionary
investigations, however, this species concept
rules out the possibility of any speciation
modes that involve descendant species
“budding off” from the ancestral species,
with the ancestral species continuing to persist. If we adopted the PSC-2, we would have
to reject, a priori, a substantial number of
possible modes of speciation. Thus, despite
the attractiveness of stability, we reject the
PSC-2 because, in the words of Popper
(1968:250), “Yet we should abstain from issuing prohibitions that draw limits to the
possibilities of research.”
The CSC is the complement of the PSC-2,
recognizing species on the basis of evidence
of character evolution alone. It therefore
permits one to recognize species in the absence of evidence of lineage splitting. This
sets the upper limit on the number of possible species for a given set of organisms and
their characteristics, providing insight in
what we may be missing or may have missed.

The origin and fixation of each apomorphic
trait, it is argued, requires permanent lineage splitting; therefore, each apomorphic
trait indicates the present or prior existence
of a distinct species. In this regard, the CSC
differs sharply from the PSC-1 and PSC-2,
both of which permit evolutionary change
within a single species lineage, or anagenesis,
a process that cannot occur in the CSC. Anagenesis is important for estimating times
and rates of divergence, and for distinguishing the reproductive and ecological roles of
species (Futuyma, 1989). Consequently, the
CSC also presents an a priori constraint on
the kinds of phenomena evolutionary biologists may study.
The PSC-1 is the most conservative approach in terms of evidence, requiring evidence of both lineage splitting and character evolution to recognize a species. And yet,
it is the most open to scientific scrutiny since
it does not rule out any putative evolutionary processes a priori. It can even be challenged by the postulates of additional species made by the other two concepts. For the
PSC-2, the hypothesis that a particular terminal taxon is not a persistent ancestor can
be corroborated by finding an apomorphy
for the terminal taxon. In such a case, the
number of species recognized by the PSC-1
would increase toward the number recognized by the PSC-2. Likewise, for the CSC
the hypothesis that each apomorphy on a
branch was accompanied by lineage splitting
would be corroborated each time a new
taxon that possessed only a subset of the
apomorphies of what was considered previously to be a single species is found. In such
a case, the number of species recognized by
the PSC-1 would increase toward the number recognized by the CSC. It therefore appears that all species recognized by the
PSC-1 are recognized by the PSC-2 and CSC,
and empirical corroboration of the postulates of additional species stemming from
either the PSC-2 or CSC will always narrow
the gap among all three. Or, to put it another way, if we say that in the absence of
character differences, two species are the
same, the PSC-1 and PSC-2 become the
same concept. Likewise, if we say that in the
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absence of evidence of lineage splitting,
there has been no permanent lineage splitting, the CSC becomes the PSC-1. This
makes the PSC-1 the primary historical species concept, with the PSC-2 and CSC embodying challenges to any hypotheses about
numbers of persistent ancestors or numbers
of unrecognized irreversible lineage splits.
All three historical species concepts recognize only those non-persistent ancestral
species for which there is evidence of character evolution. As first noted by Wiley
(1980a), this is due to a limitation of the
method of phylogenetic systematic analysis,
from which the assessment of species stems.
Figure 2A shows the historical sequence of
two speciation events producing terminal
species A, B, and C. The common ancestor
of A, B, and C is indicated by an apomorphic
trait; likewise, B and C exhibit autapomorphic traits. Figure 2B shows the phylogenetic
tree for these taxa and characters resulting
from phylogenetic systematic analysis. For
Figure 2B, the PSC-1 and CSC would recognize three species (A, B, and C), with A being a persistent ancestor; the PSC-2 would
recognize four species, since A and the ancestor cannot be the same species. For Figure 2A, the PSC-1 and CSC would still recognize three species (A, B and C), with A
being an ancestral species that persisted

without character change through 2 speciation events. The PSC-2 would recognize five
species because the ancestor of B + its sister
and the ancestor of C + A could not be the
same species. In such cases, the PSC-1 will
recognize the correct number of species involved, even if the phylogenetic analysis fails
to indicate the correct number of independent speciation events.
Frost and Kluge (1994) suggested that
both the CSC and PSC-2 may overestimate
the number of species by including entities
that do not represent permanent or irreversible lineage splitting (see also Kornet [1993]
and discussion later in this contribution). As
our ability to discriminate groups of organisms at the molecular level improves, this
will become a non-trivial concern. Frost and
Kluge (1994) believed it is contradictory to
say that a species can survive itself; that is, it
is logically inconsistent to recognize persistent ancestors. However, as we have shown
above, the way in which the PSC-2 and CSC
may overestimate lineage splitting is by
counting only lineages or only apomorphic
traits, thus postulating taxa in the absence of
evidence of lineage splitting and character
evolution. If we should not recognize species unless there is evidence of both lineage
splitting and character evolution, as embodied by the PSC-1, it is logically inconsistent

FIG. 2. Limits of resolution of phylogenetic analysis with respect to speciation. A) Pictorial depiction of two
episodes of speciation in which the common ancestor does not disappear, resulting in three distinct species. B)
Cladogram of those three species derived from phylogenetic analysis.
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to state that there can be no persistent ancestral species because the PSC-1 permits
persistent ancestors to be postulated. At the
same time, we must point out that there are
substantial technical difficulties associated
with designating particular species as persistent ancestors even in a phylogenetic context (Wiley, 1981).
Stevens (1992) recently noted, “It is not
clear to me that our taxonomic interests can
be squared with the taxonomic species. We
are interested in the whole process of evolution, not only in what ‘has evolved.’ ” The
ESC and its operational surrogate, the PSC1, seem to bridge this gap. For most evolutionary biologists, this breakthrough would
seem to be a cause for universal rejoicing.
Yet it is not so. For example, Frost and Kluge
(1994) and Frost et al. (1992) believed that
taxonomy ought to reflect evolutionary history. At the same time, they asserted that
considerations of evolutionary processes
should not intrude on systematic practice.
This perspective views the relationship between pattern and process in science as one
of antagonism rather than complementarity.
But if we are to maintain that there is no
necessary connection between systematics
and the unifying principle of biology, what is
the point of systematics? We believe this position is impossible. For example, Frost and
Kluge’s (1994) own assertion that there
can be no persistent ancestors invokes prohibitions about certain evolutionary mechanisms, thereby giving weight to alternative
mechanisms.
We also believe this position is undesirable. It appears that in the absence of guidelines provided by the overarching/unifying
theory, decision-making about species based
solely on patterns must eventually resort to
authoritarianism to maintain their position
as species. We do not think this will generate
support for systematics. For example, despite Frost and Kluge’s (1994) recommendation that the term “speciation” be retired
or used only to refer to studies of the modes
of initiating irreversible splits in historical
lineages, biologists working on several different types of research programs will continue to say that they are interested in spe-

ciation. We will touch on three of these research programs in this paper, emphasizing
that having a phylogenetic tree is necessary
but not sufficient for the study of speciation.
In other words, we need to study what species are in order to understand why species
are.
Evaluating species
As noted above, Frost and Kluge (1994)
stated that both discovery methods and
evaluation criteria were required for assessing evolutionary species. Through phylogenetic systematics, we discover historical, mutually exclusive, and diagnosable entities.
Our ontology suggests that, among such entities, the ones that comprise evolutionary
species will be cohesive systems and participants in speciation processes. Examining
the ways in which species maintain their
identities and in which new species are
formed thus constitutes valuable research
aimed at evaluating our understanding of
species and the evolution of biodiversity
(Brooks and McLennan, 1991).
If one proceeds from a non-dimensional
species concept, these phenomena can be
studied only indirectly by means of models
used as exemplars or metaphors of possible
evolutionary phenomena. For example,
studies of the modes by which species originate are often done by comparing two species presumed to be “closely related” (this
usually means they are congeneric, conflating taxonomy with phylogeny) and
which exhibit certain geographic and demographic features predicted by theories of
particular modes of speciation. If data comparing those two species conform to theory,
it does not matter if the species are, in fact,
sister species (i.e. actual products of a particular speciation event). What is important
is the use of a system defined not by evolution but by the investigator, using naturally
occurring biological units as variables in a
model of how speciation might work. Such
studies are interested in finding naturalappearing support for models of speciation
rather than explaining the origins of any
particular species. Likewise, studies of the
evolution of the traits by which species main-
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tain their individuality need only document
the ways in which any particular species
maintains itself as a single evolutionary system and then use those traits as the explanation for the emergence of the species in
the first place. Such studies are fueled by the
belief that it is impossible to reconstruct past
evolutionary events.
If one begins with a historical species concept, however, these investigations can be
performed in a more direct manner. This
approach emphasizes explaining actual speciation events. By dealing with actual speciation events, the investigator gains information about the workings of different speciation modes that can be used, in part, to test
and refine models of speciation. This, in
turn, permits us to ask questions about the
relative frequency of occurrence of different
modes based on empirical observations
rather than theoretical possibilities. Proceeding from a historical species concept
also provides a way to examine theories
about the evolution of cohesive and isolating traits without having to stipulate their
existence and significance a priori.
Modes of initiating speciation
The fusion of ecology and population genetics in the 1960s produced a world view in
which a number of fundamental evolutionary processes, including speciation, were
simply demographic accidents, whose probability was based on variables such as population structure, patterns of isolation, and
differential selection pressures. In such
cases, it is not necessary to isolate each particular speciation event; all one needs to do
is find situations that conform to various
models, even if the species involved are not
sister species. The historical ecological perspective, however, is that each speciation
event has its own explanation, though the
realm of possible modes is small enough
that we can refer to a set of speciation models. The emphasis is on explaining individual speciation events and only asking if
there are general trends after we have accumulated a significant number of cases.
Mayr (1963) recognized three general
classes of speciation. The first is reductive spe-

ciation, in which two existing species fuse to
form a third. Harlan and DeWet (1963) proposed the term “compilo-species” for cases
in which one species absorbs another; however, examples of this phenomenon have
not been documented to date. The second is
phyletic speciation, in which forms in a gradual
progression within a single lineage are assigned species status at different points in
time. As noted above, we consider each individually evolving lineage to be a single species; therefore, phyletic speciation represents evolutionary change within a single
species, termed anagenesis. The third class,
additive speciation or cladogenesis, is characterized by an increase in the number of species.
The majority of speciation models, although
based on several different mechanisms, are
models of additive speciation. The most important thing to remember about speciation
is not that it produces species, but that it
produces sister species, so you cannot formulate explanations about speciation modes
based on analysis of a single species. Rather,
you need to examine sister species and
clades.
Wiley (1981; see also Bush, 1975a, 1975b;
Endler, 1977; Felsenstein, 1981; Lande,
1980, 1981; Mayr, 1954, 1963; Templeton,
1980, 1981, 1982, 1989; White, 1978; Wiley
and Mayden, 1985; Wright, 1978) suggested
that various models of additive speciation
could be studied if phylogenetic, biogeographic and population biological data were
available, and if three assumptions could be
met. First, character evolution must provide
a reliable basis for reconstructing sequences
of speciation events; that is, speciation has
left a trace of its action which we can detect.
This assumption requires the operation of
one of two processes—character evolution
tightly coupled with speciation (punctuated
equilibrium) or character evolution that occurs at the same or higher rate than lineage
splitting. Thus, even if the divergence of particular characters is not driving the divergence of the lineages, there will be a historical trail of character anagenesis highlighting
speciation events. Although the second condition represents the traditional perspective
of evolutionary biologists, the recent advent
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of punctuated equilibrium models (Eldredge and Gould, 1972) has strengthened
the proposition of a causal relationship between character modification and speciation. The first assumption is violated if gene
flow is halted permanently between populations at a faster rate than character change is
occurring. If this happens, the traits present
in each species will represent a combination
of (i) characters that existed prior to the
isolation of the populations, providing information about common ancestry (symplesiomorphies) and (ii) evolutionary modifications that occurred subsequent to the population’s isolation, providing information
about the unique status of the population
(autapomorphies). Since derived traits are
not shared between populations under
these circumstances, sequences of speciation events will be difficult or impossible to
determine.
The second assumption is that there have
been no extinctions in the clade. If we are to
use phylogenetic trees to study particular
modes of speciation, we must have confidence that sister species are each other’s
closest relatives and not, in reality, more distantly related due to the extinction of several unknown intermediate species. Consider the following hypothetical example.
Two groups of fish, demonstrated to be sister species on the basis of a phylogenetic
analysis, are located on either side of a
mountain range. Based on these observations, we might hypothesize that the disjunct
distribution was caused when the upheaval
of the mountains separated the ancestral
species into two populations, which subsequently diverged in isolation. Unfortunately
for our theory, a group of enthusiastic paleontologists discover an abundance of fossil
evidence, suggesting that at least two other
species fall between the extant representatives. Hence, the current disjunction of
fishes B and C was probably derived through
a series of speciation and extinction events,
only one of which need have been associated with the tectonic activity.
The third assumption postulates that the
influence of geographical separation during
the evolutionary divergence of a clade has

not been obscured by rampant dispersal of
the descendant species. Pairs of sister species or clades that show such dissemination
may be identified by large-scale sympatry;
however, uncovering such sympatry creates
a problem because it is difficult to determine
whether the current distribution pattern existed during the speciation of the group, or
whether it represents widespread dispersal
following speciation in isolation. This highlights an important and often misconstrued
aspect of the relationship between speciation and dispersal. The third assumption
does not state that dispersal is unimportant,
it states only that post-speciation dispersal
does not overwhelm speciation patterns.
Like many biological assumptions, this is a
necessary starting point because without it
we have no a priori justification for attempting to reconstruct speciation patterns, and
thus no hope of studying the process. Unlike
many biological assumptions, data are available to examine the validity of this supposition. For example, Lynch (1989) examined
the distributions of 66 pairs of sister species
and concluded that sister species rarely exhibit significant geographic overlap.
It is probably true that many groups will
not satisfy all the assumptions; however, until a larger database is established, it is impossible to determine whether these nonconformists need be accorded the status of
an overwhelming majority or a confounding
minority. We are confident that enough
clades will emerge that satisfy the assumptions given above to enable us to investigate
particular speciation models directly.
Cohesion and Isolation:
Maintaining “Specieshood”
Fertilization systems and specific-mate
recognition systems (SMRSs) lie at the core
of both cohesion and isolation concepts of
species. A fertilization system includes mate
recognition, courtship events (premating
mechanisms) leading to fertilization, and
recognition of gametes in fertilization (postmating events); an SMRS is the subset of
attributes of a fertilization system that promote cohesion in particular social and eco-
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logical contexts. Thus, for cohesion concepts a species is the “most inclusive population of biparental individual organisms
which share a common fertilization system”
(Paterson, 1985); for isolation concepts a
species is “a reproductive community of
populations (reproductively isolated from
others) that occupies a specific niche in nature” (Mayr, 1982). From this starting point
we can derive three general classes of phenomena that enhance species cohesion. Sexual selection promotes cohesion through effects on pre-mating events. Changes in the
rest of the genetic components of the fertilization system (gamete recognition, fertilization, ontogeny) promote cohesion through
effects on post-mating events. Finally, adaptation to specific habitats promotes cohesion through effects on the social and environmental context of pre- and post-mating
events.
These three classes of phenomena can enhance cohesion in two ways. First, the worst
thing that can happen to a species is to go
extinct. Individual organisms contribute to
the maintenance of a species by breeding.
Thus, for all species there is an evolutionary
penalty for individuals not breeding. All cohesion-enhancing processes have the effect
of reducing the probability of not breeding.
Second, there is also an evolutionary penalty
for organisms that make mistakes in breeding (mating with a member of a different
species). All cohesion-enhancing processes
also have the effect of reducing the probability of making a mistake in mating. When
there is only the possibility of being penalized for not breeding, we refer to cohesion
concepts of species. When there is also the
possibility of being penalized for making a
mistake in breeding, we refer to isolation
concepts of species.
Some species originate under conditions
of spatial separation from those species with
which there is a possibility of making mistakes in mating and never come into contact
with those species. When adaptation to specific habitats under such conditions leads to
the evolution of a new SMRS (also possibly
including pre- and post-mating phenomena), we have the Recognition Concept (Pa-

terson, 1978, 1982, 1985, 1987). In such
cases, however, the other two classes of cohesion-enhancing processes also can operate and, in the absence of adaptation to specific habitats, promote the emergence and
maintenance of the species as a distinct evolutionary system. Other species may originate under conditions of secondary contact
with species with which there is a possibility
of making mistakes in mating. In such circumstances, adaptation to specific habitats
and sexual selection enhancing cohesion
are called pre-mating isolating mechanisms
(Mayr, 1963). In a complementary manner,
changes in the other parts of the fertilization system under such conditions that enhance cohesion are called post-mating isolating mechanisms (Mayr, 1963). Finally, some
species may originate under conditions of
primary contact with species—often their
sister species—with which there is a possibility of making mistakes in mating. Once
again, all three classes of cohesion-enhancing processes can operate under such conditions to promote the emergence and
maintenance of the species as a distinct evolutionary system.
Thus, it appears that the distinction between cohesion and isolation concepts of
species does not involve different evolutionary mechanisms so much as it involves questions of the degree and timing of geographical contact between an emerging species
and other species with which it might make
a mating mistake. For isolationists, such as
Mayr, geographic isolation (by dispersal or
by vicariance) leads to post-mating isolating
mechanisms as a result of genetic divergence under selection or by drift; secondary
contact leads to selection for pre-mating isolating mechanisms when it is evolutionarily
costly to make mating mistakes. For cohesive
species advocates, such as Paterson, geographic isolation leads to the emergence of
a unique SMRS (a synonym for the suite of
features that make a species a cohesive information system); at secondary contact, organisms having one SMRS do not recognize
those having another, so there are no mating mistakes. Viewed in this way, we can see
that “isolation” is a special case of “cohe-
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sion,” based on secondary contact with any
species sharing enough plesiomorphic components of the mating system that mating
mistakes could be made, in a system where
there is an evolutionary penalty for making
mating mistakes.
Macro- and Micro-species
Some biologists studying species and speciation still disavow historical approaches,
reiterating the belief that phylogenies permit us only to see what happened in the
past, and that does not help us understand
what is happening now or what might happen in the future. Some systematists, in return, have adopted an equally reductionist
view, namely that it is only through historical
approaches that we learn anything about
species and speciation. We believe that both
components are necessary, but not sufficient, for providing truly robust evolutionary
explanations. We suggested above that Kornet’s Composite Species Concept (CSC) was
not our choice as the general historical species concept because it does not allow anagenesis or vicariance. Kornet’s proposal,
however, embodies a critical element for
truly integrative studies of species and speciation, and gives us insight into the fundamental relationship between micro- and
macroevolution.
The evolutionary ecology revolution established a perspective whereby evolving
species are commonly viewed as collections
of populations distributed horizontally
across geography (e.g. Brown and Gibson,
1984; Brown, 1995). Kornet (1993) viewed
them as lineages sub-divided into smaller
lineages extending through time. Some of
those lineages experience permanent, or irreversible, splits from each other; many others do not. From a purely historical standpoint, Kornet (1993) considered only those
lineages experiencing permanent splits to
be different species.
Those species experiencing non-permanent, or reversible, splits represent the
realm of possibilities for what might happen
in the future—the realm of what is happen-

ing right now. These splits should be relatively numerous, localized, locally differentiated, and highly similar due to their close
common history, so naturally replicated exemplars will abound. These are the best systems for population biologists to study. In
general, we expect a host of demographic
phenomena, such as local extinctions and
fusion with other such splits as a result of
dispersal and gene flow, to limit the number
of such micro-species that experience permanent splits. These lineages experiencing
permanent (irreversible) splits, the macrospecies, tell us what actually happened and
may give us insights into constraints on the
evolutionary future. They indicate which of
the micro-species become macro-species in
their own rights, establishing yet more sets
of micro-species. These species should be
less numerous than the micro-species and
should be better individuated because they
embody a history of irreversible change.
These are the species that systematists find
easiest to characterize, and they are the ones
with which we can most easily do macroevolutionary analyses. Because they define the
historical context within which the microdynamics are played out, we will be better
able to understand, from a phylogenetic
perspective, the conditions under which
they emerged than the processes that maintain them today.
For example, isolationists, such as Mayr,
postulated that geographic isolation (by dispersal or by vicariance) leads to post-mating
isolating mechanisms as a result of genetic
divergence by selection or drift. Secondary
contact between isolated and partially differentiated populations would lead to selection
for pre-mating isolating mechanisms when it
is evolutionarily costly to make mating mistakes. So, we may be able to identify circumstances in which there is selection pressure
for pre-mating isolating mechanisms. That,
however, does not mean that any such thing
will evolve. If pre-mating isolating mechanisms do not evolve under such circumstances, we expect the populations split
apart by geographic isolation to re-establish
levels and forms of genetic exchange char-
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acteristic of the parental species, in which
case we would find that the split was not
permanent.
These macro-species can be considered
emergent, historical macrostates whose microstates are the micro-species contained
within them. As macrostates, these historical
lineages do not themselves participate in
any active processes—they are the statistical
average or summation of their constituent
micro-species. Those micro-species, in turn,
do not participate directly in any macroevolutionary phenomena. Only those that
achieve the status of permanent splits, that
experience irreversible splitting from their
ancestral lineage, do so. Such macro-species,
in turn, provide the historically constrained
arena within which the dynamics of new micro-species are played out, and from which
new macro-species may emerge.
Kornet’s (1993) distinction between nonpermanent (reversible) splits (micro-species)
and permanent (irreversible) splits (macrospecies) thus provides us with a clear view of
a major component differentiating microand macroevolution. That component is not
magnitude but rather quality. It embodies
time, and history, because it is the difference
between reversible and irreversible phenomena (Wiley and Brooks, 1982; Brooks and
Wiley, 1988). Adopting this view helps us
“make up for lost time” in evolutionary biology, helping end the eclipse of history.
And there is nothing mysterious about the
reversible/irreversible distinction. Maynard
Smith and Szathmary (1995) recently suggested that biological processes become effectively irreversible whenever two or more
individually improbable events affect a given
system sequentially in time. To this we would
add that both micro- and macro-species can
be affected irreversibly by extrinsic factors
(the nature of the conditions), most notably
tectonic activity or major changes in environmental conditions or environmental
harshness (Cracraft, 1985). Such influences
can be singular and need not be improbable
a priori (though they may be probabilistic
rather than deterministic in their occurrence).

Conclusions
“Theories are nets cast to catch ‘the
world’ . . . We endeavour to make the mesh
ever finer and finer.” (Popper, 1968:59).
Darwin (1859, 1872) worried that not all
taxonomic species corresponded to systems
affected by natural selection and that not all
systems affected by natural selection were
species. We believe that the various nondimensional species concepts proposed capture different parts of the world of biological
diversity. Because species are produced by
individual speciation events, we should not
expect any particular non-dimensional concept to apply to all species, perhaps not even
to all members of a given clade. We also
believe that, in general, both population biologists and systematists recognize real
causal units of evolution. Neither one, however, is reducible to the other, and robust
explanations about both the origin and
maintenance of these systems through time
require information from both micro- and
macroevolutionary sources.
Not having a universally agreed-upon species concept has not impeded our learning
much about species and their origins. Neither has it been, nor should it now be, an
impediment to describing and naming taxonomic entities. The study of species has
been powered by disagreements among biologists. It is thus important for biologists to
continue to argue about, and apply, many
different operational species concepts in order to continue to expand our realm of
knowledge about evolution. The hierarchical research program outlined in this contribution is one effort to catch biological diversity in a net of “mesh ever finer and
finer.” The alternative is to doom biologists
to the role of the blind trying to describe an
elephant.
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